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ABSTR ACT: Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in
his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western
policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This
article examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced
annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means”
to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on
“hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin
determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in
determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for
an uncertain future.
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V

ladimir Putin had a very bad September.1 The Ukrainian counteroffensive
in the northeast of the country has been a staggering success, and it
continues. Kyiv liberated more territory in two weeks than Russia seized
in the previous five months.2 Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi during their meetings with Putin in Uzbekistan were
clearly unsupportive of Russia’s aggression.3
The strategy Putin had for this war of aggression is now in tatters. It was based
on two false assumptions. First, he assumed his army would quickly defeat the
Ukrainians, topple Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration, and occupy a sizable
portion of the country. He grossly underestimated the Ukrainians’ ability to resist
and overestimated his own forces. The vaunted Russian Army has suffered from
poor morale, abysmal leadership, and an inability to provide the necessary logistical
support for Putin’s invading force. Second, Putin believed the West would not be
able to mount a unified response. He thought the West’s reaction would be similar to
that of 2014 when he annexed Crimea and fomented a quasi-civil war using
proxy forces in southeastern Ukraine. But Washington and its NATO allies have
1. Phil McCausland, “What Now for Putin? After Russian Retreat, the Kremlin Has Few Good Options
in Ukraine,” NBC News (website), September 16, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-retreats
-ukraine-what-will-putin-do-military-kremlin-rcna47514.
2. Steve Hendrix, Serhii Korolchuk, and Robyn Dixon, “Amid Ukraine’s Startling Gains, Liberated Villages
Describe Russian Troops Dropping Rifles and Fleeing,” Washington Post (website), September 11, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/11/kharkiv-liberated-retreat-izyum-russia/.
3. Mukhammadsharif Mamatkulov, “India’s Modi Assails Putin over Ukraine War,” Reuters (website),
September 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putin-xi-speak-summit-uzbekistan-2022-09-16/.
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shown surprising unity in their support for Kyiv, and with the addition of
Finland and Sweden the alliance may be stronger now than it was at the onset
of this conflict.
Putin had two options in the aftermath of his most recent military and
diplomatic reversals. He could have cranked up his propaganda machine
and declared his “special military operation” a remarkable success.4 He could
have argued Russia had “denazified” large portions of Ukraine, reduced the
threat Kyiv posed, and sent a clear message to the West. He could have
accompanied these arguments with the announcement of a cease-fire and a
call for negotiations. These actions might have paused the war and offered
him a chance to use the upcoming winter to reorganize his forces. His second
option was escalation. With a speech to the Russian people on September 21,
2022, he chose the latter.5 It is critical to consider what this means and how he
might escalate further.
Putin escalated the war in three ways. First, he announced a partial
mobilization. The Kremlin claimed this mobilization would consist of 300,000
reservists or those with previous military experience.6 As the first Russian
armed forces mobilization since World War II, it underscores the Russian
Army’s desperate need for manpower—especially now: the Pentagon estimates
the Kremlin has suffered around 80,000 casualties since this war began.7 This
desperate gamble is, in part, a response to right-wing hardliners in the Russian
media who have been openly critical after a string of recent defeats.8 But Putin
risks greater social unrest and opposition to the war at home with the decision
to escalate. Unrest and opposition are now occurring in many cities across
Russia.9 A reported minimum of 1,300 people have been arrested following
demonstrations, and thousands of young Russian men have fled the country.10
Up to this point, most Russians have been apathetic about the war, as Putin
4. Bloomberg News, “Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine,” Bloomberg (website),
February 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s
-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24.
5. Evan Gershkovich, Thomas Grove, and Alan Cullison, “Putin Orders Draft of Reservists for Ukraine War,
Threatens Nuclear Response,” Wall Street Journal (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/putin-orders-draft-of-reservists-for-war-in-ukraine-threatens-nuclear-response-11663742871.
6. TASS, Russian News Agency, “Partial Mobilization Applies to Reservists with Military Experience,
Specialty,” TASS, Russian News Agency (website), September 21, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1511049.
7. Nancy A. Youssef and Evan Gershkovich, “As Many as 80,000 Russian Troops Hurt or Killed in Ukraine,
Pentagon Says,” Wall Street Journal (website), August 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-many-as
-80-000-russian-troops-hurt-or-killed-in-ukraine-pentagon-says-11659989514.
8. Associated Press, “Vladimir Putin Vows to Send More Invaders. The West Should Arm Ukraine Faster,”
Economist (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/09/21/vladimir-putin-vows
-to-send-more-invaders-the-west-should-arm-ukraine-faster; and Mary Ilyushina, “Faced with War Losses,
Russian Propagandists Retreat to Anger and Patriotism,” Washington Post (website), September 12, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/12/russia-losses-propaganda-react-ukraine/.
9. Evan Gershkovich, “Russians Seek to Mount Resistance to Putin as Mobilization Gears Up,” Wall Street
Journal (website), September 24, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russians-seek-to-mount-resistance-to
-putin-as-mobilization-gears-up-11664054571.
10. Gershkovich, Grove, and Cullison, “Putin Orders Draft.”
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sought to insulate the population from its ill effects: while the Ukrainian
counteroffensive was gaining momentum, Putin was dedicating a Ferris wheel
in Moscow and urging the Russian people to enjoy themselves.11
The mobilization will test the loyalty of those born after the demise of the
Soviet Union and those less fond of the Russian strongman. It will have little
significant immediate effect on the battlefield, could backfire, and will likely
fail. It will take weeks, if not months, to identify, organize, train (or retrain),
equip, and deploy these new troops.12 With the impending arrival of winter,
these new forces are unlikely to appear in significant numbers until spring.
There have also been reports that the Russian Army stripped troops from its
training base as the military situation deteriorated, and this will further slow
the training and deployment of new troops. Russia has lost thousands of tanks,
armored vehicles, trucks, and aircraft.13 Consequently, it may be difficult to
equip new units with modern weaponry.
Even from the onset, the Kremlin may intend for this “partial mobilization”
to far exceed the stated goal of 300,000 and has also included many Russian
men who have no prior military experience. The mobilization is also
disproportionately aimed at minority groups, rural areas, and territories in
the Far East rather than large cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. This
disparity has already resulted in unrest in these areas.14 Several experts have
now suggested more Russians have fled the country since the mobilization
announcement than have fought in Ukraine, and some of Putin’s strongest
supporters have been less than enthusiastic. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov
has said recruitment will not be extended to Chechnya since it has already
exceeded its targets for recruitment.15
The mobilization announcement included increased penalties for Russian
soldiers who surrender or desert. It also involuntarily extends the contracts
of soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.16 There were widespread reports of
Russian soldiers fleeing the advance of Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv and
11. Amit Chaturvedi, ed., “Vladimir Putin Opens New Ferris Wheel as Russian Forces Receive Stunning
Setback in Ukraine,” NDTV (website), September 12, 2022, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-ukraine
-war-vladimir-putin-opens-new-ferris-wheel-as-russian-forces-receive-stunning-setback-in-ukraine-3337891.
12. Lawrence Freedman, “All the Tsar’s Men: Why Mobilization Can’t Save Putin’s War,” Foreign Affairs
(website), September 23, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/all-tsars-men.
13. David Axe, “The Russian Army Is Losing a Battalion Every Day as Ukrainian Counterattacks
Accelerate,” Forbes (website), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/11/the-russian-army-is-losing-a
-battalion-every-day-as-ukrainian-counterattacks-accelerate/.
14. Anton Troianovski, “Russia’s Draft Is Drawing Criticism from Far-Flung Regions and Even Pro-War
Hawks,” New York Times (website), September 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/world/europe
/russias-draft-is-drawing-criticism-from-far-flung-regions-and-even-pro-war-hawks.html.
15. Associated Press, “Chechnya Exempts Itself from Russia’s Draft,” Moscow Times (website),
September 23, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/23/chechnya-exempts-itself-from-russias
-draft-a78874.
16. Youssef and Gershkovich, “80,000 Russian Troops Hurt.”
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abandoning massive amounts of equipment.17 Some soldiers even stripped off
their uniforms and attempted to escape in civilian clothes.18 Consequently,
it is hard to believe Russia can succeed—with troops with already sagging
morale and poor leadership, training, and equipment—by forcing more young
Russians to fight in a war they do not support.
Second, Putin described this conflict as primarily between Russia and
the West. He falsely claimed Western leaders threatened the very existence
of the “Motherland.” Consequently, Putin warned he would “use all the
means at [Russia’s] disposal to protect Russia and [its] people,” adding
“[t]his is not a bluff.”19 This obvious threat to employ nuclear weapons comes
at an ironic moment: the 60th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis,
the last time the United States was involved in a crisis that threatened global
nuclear catastrophe.
Putin’s decision to escalate is a blatant attempt to intimidate NATO,
Ukraine, and Washington. But it also represents Putin’s effort to reshape
the narrative. In this case, he appeals to Russian nationalism. Previously, he
falsely described Russia’s very existence as imperiled by outside forces and called
upon the nation to respond as their ancestors did against the Napoleonic
invasion of 1812 or the Germans’ attack in World War II.
Third, he supported the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian
provinces via sham referendums.20 In their aftermath, Putin signed an
annexation decree and delivered a fiery speech assailing the United States for
“satanism.”21 He further argued the West was an “enemy” of Russia that sought
to destroy the nation.22 The forcible seizure of these territories is the largest
land grab in Europe since World War II. It makes a mockery of international
law, and few nations, if any, are likely to accept Russian sovereignty over these
provinces. Furthermore, it makes the possibility of negotiations even more
17. Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Jacobs, and Samy Adghirni, “Ukraine Seizes Dozens of Russian Tanks
Left by Fleeing Forces,” Bloomberg (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2022-09-21/ukraine-seizes-dozens-of-russian-tanks-left-by-fleeing-forces.
18. Sophia Ankel, “They Were Afraid of Being Caught: Russian Soldiers Escaped in Civilian Clothes,”
Business Insider (website), September 12, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-troops-drop-guns-flee
-ukraine-counteroffensive-reports-2022-9.
19. Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin Escalates Ukraine War, Issues Nuclear Threat to West,” Reuters (website),
September 21, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-decree-mobilisation-says-west-wants
-destroy-russia-2022-09-21/.
20. Anton Troianovski, “Russia Signals Annexation of Parts of Ukraine, Raising Stakes in Fighting,”
New York Times (website), September 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/20/world/europe/russia
-annex-ukraine-referendum.html.
21. Associated Press, “Russia-Ukraine War: Putin Frames Illegal Annexation as Part of Existential Battle
with West,” New York Times, September 30, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/30/world/russia
-ukraine-war-news.
22. “[Signing of Agreements on the Admission of the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson
Regions to Russia],” Kremlin (website), September 30, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president
/news/69465.
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remote as Putin described this move as “irreversible.”23 In the same speech,
he called on the Zelensky administration to accept the permanent transfer of
these territories, accept a cease-fire, and enter into talks. In response, the Kyiv
government insisted negotiations will be impossible as long as Putin remains
in power.24
Putin’s speech also will heighten his attempt at nuclear extortion. Moscow
can now claim these areas are Russian territory and use any attacks against
them as a rationale to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in its defense. Still,
it remains to be seen if Putin is willing to do so. Only a day after Putin’s
speech, Ukrainian forces captured the strategic city of Lyman in the Donbas
region and part of the territory that Moscow now claims is Russian territory.25
It is reported many Russian soldiers fled the city in disorder while thousands
may have been captured. This major setback for Putin could be followed in the
coming weeks by further setbacks, including the possible loss of Kherson in
southern Ukraine.
Since Putin has chosen a path of escalation, what might he do in the future?
He has further escalatory options. He can threaten nuclear catastrophe with
missile and artillery strikes to disable or damage a Ukrainian nuclear power
plant and create a Chernobyl-like disaster. Recently, a missile struck less than
1,000 feet from the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant.26 External power to
the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant—the largest in Europe—has been shut
off several times, forcing the staff to use emergency power to cool the reactors.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has described the
Zaporizhzhya situation as “untenable” and “playing with fire.”27 This is a classic
example of “hybrid warfare,” the fusion of conventional and unconventional
instruments of power and tools of subversion. Moscow has employed hybrid
warfare in the past—with the invasion of Crimea in 2014, interference in
Western elections or the Brexit vote, the assassination of Putin’s opponents,
and the dissemination of misinformation. Putin can threaten nuclear facilities
at times of his choosing, which provides him the intimidating effect of nuclear
23. Lawrence Freedman, “Putin’s Annexation and Lyman’s Encirclement,” Comment is Freed (blog),
October 1, 2022, https://samf.substack.com/p/putins-annexation-and-lymans-encirclement?utm_source
=twitter&sd=pf.
24. Mykhailo Podolyak (@Podolyak_M), “Negotiations are possible, but with the new president of Russia,”
Twitter (website), October 1, 2022, 7:00 a.m., https://twitter.com/ConanOBrien/status/590940792967016448.
25. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Andrew E. Kramer, Anton Troianovski, and Catherine Porter, “Ukraine
Forces Retake Lyman, a Strategic City, as Russians Retreat,” New York Times (website), October 1, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/world/europe/lyman-ukraine-russia.html.
26. Dan Ladden-Hall, “Russian Missile Strikes within 1,000 Feet of Ukrainian Nuclear Reactors,”
Daily Beast (website), September 19, 2022, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-missile-strikes-within
-1000-feet-of-ukrainian-nuclear-reactors.
27. Joanne Liou, “Situation at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant ‘Untenable,’ Protection Zone Needed,
IAEA’s Grossi Tells Board,” International Atomic Energy Agency (website), September 12, 2022,
https: / / www.iaea.org / newscenter / news / situation-at-zaporizhzhya-nuclear-power-plant-untenable-protectionzone-needed-iaeas-grossi-tells-board.
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weapons without potential international blowback. Such threats are actually
criminal, as they endanger the staff and innocent civilians in Ukraine and
beyond. Finally, they also divert media attention away from reports on war
crimes, Russian failures on the battlefield, and other setbacks.
Putin could also further employ his energy weapon. He has already ended
the export of natural gas to Europe and could seek to do more damage.28 The
recent attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline are likely an example.29 European
and NATO leaders have described them as “sabotage,” but so far there has
been no formal allegation that Moscow perpetrated them.30 Still, these attacks
are consistent with the Russian hybrid warfare thinking previously mentioned.
Such attacks would require the Russian Navy to possess sophisticated
capabilities such as divers or undersea drones. The attacks occurred in
international waters and, consequently, could not be construed as attacks on a
NATO member’s territory that might elicit an Article 5 response.
The attacks are also clouded in plausible deniability. As a result, the Kremlin
has described any accusation against Russia as “stupid and absurd” and blamed
the United States.31 The attacks are also an implicit threat against the new
Baltic Pipeline connecting Poland and Norway, which opened at the same
time the attacks occurred.32 Finally, the attacks clearly underscore the ongoing
uncertainty around European energy supplies as winter approaches. Putin
obviously hopes skyrocketing energy costs coupled with the arrival of winter
energy demands will result in social unrest in Europe. Social unrest might
force European leaders to reduce their support for Ukraine and put pressure
on Kyiv to accept negotiations on Putin’s terms.
Putin’s expanded attacks on the Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure and
the closure of nuclear power plants already belong to this effort. His attacks
have reduced the availability of energy to Ukraine and will likely result in more
Ukrainian refugees as winter arrives. Putin’s action renews pressure on NATO

28. Sam Meredith, “Russia Has Cut Off Gas Supplies to Europe Indefinitely. Here’s What You Need
to Know,” CNBC (website), September 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/06/energy-crisis-why-has
-russia-cut-off-gas-supplies-to-europe.html.
29. Jen Kirby, “The Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage, Explained,” Vox (website), September 28, 2022,
https://www.vox.com/world/2022/9/28/23376356/nord-stream-pipeline-russia-explosions-sabotage.
30. Merlyn Thompson and Elsa Maishman, “Nord Stream Leaks: Sabotage to Blame, Says EU,” BBC News
(website), September 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63057966.
31. Thompson and Maishman, “Sabotage to Blame”; and Reuters Staff, “Putin Says ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Powers Blew
up Nord Stream Pipelines,” Reuters (website), September 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine
-crisis-putin-nordstream-idAFS8N2Z80FZ.
32. Anna Wlodarczak-Semczuk and Kirsten Donovan, “Gas Starts Flowing to Poland through New Baltic
Pipe Pipeline,” Reuters (website), October 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/gas-starts
-flowing-poland-through-new-baltic-pipe-pipeline-2022-10-01/.
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countries, discourages them from maintaining their existing nuclear facilities,
and forces them to consider sharing limited supplies with Kyiv.
Moscow could use the “food weapon” and once again halt the export of
Ukrainian grain from its Black Sea ports. In July 2022, an agreement signed
by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the United Nations allowed for the export
of millions of tons of Ukrainian and Russian grain and fertilizer.33 Ukraine
and Russia provide roughly 30 percent of the world’s grain, and the failure to
deliver these commodities to global markets may well result in famine in many
parts of the world.34 Some have claimed Russia is waging a campaign of “theft
and destruction” of Ukrainian agriculture reminiscent of the famines caused by
Joseph Stalin in the 1930s.35
Finally, Putin could escalate militarily through further force mobilizations,
strikes on NATO locations important to the flow of military assistance to
Ukraine, or expanded cyberattacks. The use of nuclear weapons, as Putin
threatened, could also be an option. Graham T. Allison, author of the celebrated
book on the Cuban missile crisis Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Little, Brown, 1971), observed that the possibility of Russian
nuclear use clearly increases if Russia perceives a growing existential threat
to itself or its rule. Allison recounted that in 1962 President John F. Kennedy
believed the possible use of nuclear weapons became a “more plausible scenario
if a leader is forced to choose between catastrophic humiliation and a roll
of the dice that might yield success.”36 Should Putin decide to use nuclear
weapons, the system used would likely be a tactical nuclear weapon, of which
Russia is believed to have 2,000. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed with
a nuclear yield below 100 kilotons and delivered by short-range aircraft,
artillery, or missiles.37
While the West cannot ignore the possibility of expanded military threats,
the probability of Putin using nuclear weapons appears low at this moment

33. Associated Press, “Ukraine, Russia Agree to Export Grain, Ending a Standoff That Threatened Food
Supply,” NPR (website), July 22, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/22/1112880942/ukraine-grain-exports
-deal.
34. Heinz Strubenhoff, “The War in Ukraine Triggered a Global Food Shortage,” Brookings (website),
June 14, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/06/14/the-war-in-ukraine-triggered
-a-global-food-shortage/.
35. Lyudmyla Pavlyuk, “Kennan Cable No. 79: Russia Is Looting Ukraine’s Breadbasket . . . Again,”
Kennan Cable 79 (September 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-79-russia
-looting-ukraines-breadbasketagain.
36. David E. Sanger, Anton Troianovski, and Julian E. Barnes, “In Washington, Putin’s Nuclear Threats
Stir Growing Alarm,” New York Times, October 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/world/europe
/washington-putin-nuclear-threats.html.
37. “Reports & Multimedia/Explainer: What Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons?,” Union of Concerned
Scientists (website), June 1, 2022, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/tactical-nuclear-weapons.
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for several reasons.38 First, Russian military doctrine calls for the use of such
weapons primarily to create conditions on the battlefield that can then be
rapidly exploited by conventional forces. But Moscow no longer has readily
available forces to exploit opportunities any such employment might offer.
Russia has failed to demonstrate the ability to conduct large-scale offensive
operations effectively for the past seven months in a nonnuclear environment.
It is hard to imagine how reinforcing Russian forces, in their state of
degradation, with poorly trained conscripts could possibly allow for successful
operations in a nuclear environment demanding a much more sophisticated
level of training, equipment, and command and control.
Second, Putin would become even more of an international pariah. The
tepid support he now receives from China, India, and other countries in the
Global South would likely evaporate.39 Third, he would have to consider the
response by the West. This could include the imposition of a no-fly zone over
Ukraine, expanded military assistance, and even the direct involvement of
Western ground forces. Washington has already sent private warnings about
the grave consequences to follow should Moscow cross the nuclear threshold.40
Fourth, the employment of such weapons in eastern Ukraine would result in
a radiation pattern that would threaten areas occupied by Putin’s forces or
existing Russian territory.
Putin’s threats of escalation have not had the immediate effect he hoped
for, and Western countries have announced their continued support for
Ukraine.41 But there is no denying the world faces extreme danger at the
moment. It is critical the West adopt policies to deter or respond to potential
future escalation by Moscow. These policies must include several important
considerations. Washington and its European allies’ greatest strength against
Russian aggression has been their unity of policy and effort in response to that
aggression. Unity must continue, but it may grow more complicated in the
aftermath of recent elections in Italy and Sweden, which seem likely to result
in the far right’s return to power.42 It may also become increasingly difficult
38. Mason Clark, Katherine Lawlor, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “SPECIAL REPORT: ASSESSING
PUTIN’S IMPLICIT NUCLEAR THREATS AFTER ANNEXATION,” Institute for the Study of War
(website), September 30, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-assessing
-putin%E2%80%99s-implicit-nuclear-threats-after-annexation.
39. Happymon Jacob, “Russia Is Losing India: How Putin’s Ukraine Gambit Doomed a Long Partnership,”
Foreign Affairs (website), September 22, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/russia-losing-india.
40. Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “U.S. Has Sent Private Warnings to Russia against Using a Nuclear
Weapon,” Washington Post (website), September 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national
-security/2022/09/22/russia-nuclear-threat-us-options/.
41. Anton Troianovski and Valerie Hopkins, “Putin Raises Stakes in the War, with Direct Challenge to the
West,” New York Times (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/21/world/europe
/putin-ukraine-russia-nuclear.html.
42. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, “The Return of Fascism in Italy,” Atlantic (website), September 23, 2022, https://www
.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/09/giorgia-meloni-italy-election-fascism-mussolini/671515/.
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to find alliance agreement on future policy with Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán or Turkish President Recep Erdoğan as the war continues.
Military support for Ukraine must continue and expand. As the war has
continued, NATO has created a sophisticated coordinating effort designed
to meet changing requirements and avoid the duplication of efforts to ensure
the delivery of equipment from donor nations to Kyiv.43 The level of military
assistance to Ukraine has been enormous. As of the end of September, the
Biden-Harris administration has provided nearly $17 billion in weapons,
ammunition, and equipment.44 Washington will need to increase its industrial
capacity dramatically to produce artillery rounds, rockets, anti-tank weapons,
and air defense needed to support Ukraine, refurbish wartime stocks, and
prepare for future conflicts.45
There is also a growing need to expand logistical and training assistance
to Ukraine, which should include contractor support in the future. These
efforts must be forward deployed to repair and maintain sophisticated military
equipment for its rapid return to the battlefield. The West will also need
to continue its economic and financial assistance to Ukraine to buttress its
economy and deal with even larger requirements for humanitarian assistance
to Ukraine and NATO frontline states.
Ukraine can attribute its success in its recent counteroffensive to the
acquisition of more sophisticated military hardware, such as the High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, and to the integration of real-time intelligence
from Washington and NATO, the latter of which has dramatically improved
targeting, with devastating effects.46 Washington and NATO must maintain
and improve the provision of real-time intelligence, as it is essential to
Ukraine’s future military success on the battlefield.
Finally, the West’s diplomatic and information efforts should be expanded.
Putin’s recent escalation of the war was roundly condemned by the vast
majority of nations at the recent UN General Assembly meeting in New
43. Vivienne Machi, “Inside the Multinational Logistics Cell Coordinating Military Aid for Ukraine,”
Defense News (website), July 21, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/07/21/inside-the
-multinational-logistics-cell-coordinating-military-aid-for-ukraine/.
44. Department of Defense (DoD), “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 28, 2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/28/2003087045/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-SEP-28.PDF.
45. Caitlin M. Kenney, “Army Wants to Double or Triple Some Arms Production as Ukraine War
Continues,” Defense One (website), September 15, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/09
/army-wants-double-or-triple-some-arms-production-ukraine-war-continues/377225/.
46. C. Todd Lopez, “U.S.-Provided HIMARS Effective in Ukraine,” DoD (website), July 15, 2022, https://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/; and
Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,”
New York Times (website), September 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/us/politics/ukraine
-military-intelligence.html.
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York.47 Evidence of war crimes should be vigorously pursued and the results
of the investigations widely disseminated. Washington and its allies must seek
to further isolate Moscow diplomatically and convince countries in the Global
South to participate in economic sanctions.
The information tool of so-called soft power is also crucially important.
Every effort should be made to use the Internet and traditional means, such as
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, to inform the people of Russia and Belarus
of the lies Moscow continues to propagate about the conflict, war crimes, sham
referendums, the flight of Russian youths, etc.
Fred C. Iklé observed in his book Every War Must End (Columbia University
Press, 1971) that wars end when one side changes its objectives—by choice or
by force. Putin’s objectives have changed multiple times. He initially sought
to capture Kyiv and topple the Zelensky administration. He then pursued the
capture of Odesa and the occupation of Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline. Putin
has now settled on an attempt to annex the Donbas in southeastern Ukraine
and portions of the coast.48 All his efforts have failed, and his September 21,
2022, speech is a clear admission of failure. His continued description of his
aggression as a “special military operation” is absurd in the aftermath of more
than half a year of war and the deaths of thousands of young Russian soldiers.
Still, Putin believes the overlapping goals of the United States, NATO,
and Ukraine are not necessarily coincident. Kyiv cannot accomplish its goal
of driving Russian forces from its territory—including Crimea—if its Western
allies are willing to accept a negotiated settlement that allows a return to the
status quo ante. Consequently, Putin still believes he can win, so to speak,
and his success will be defined by the shattering of the long-term unity of the
West. He is convinced, at this moment, at least, that his willpower is superior
to Western determination to resist.
Time will tell whether he is correct.

47. “At UN General Assembly, Leaders Condemn Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Al Jazeera (website),
September 21, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/21/at-un-general-assembly-leaders-condemns
-russias-war-in-ukraine.
48. Paul Kirby, “Why Has Russia Invaded Ukraine and What Does Putin Want?,” BBC News (website),
May 9, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589.
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